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The ‘Integrative Approach’ and Labour Regulation and Indonesia: 
Prospects and Challenges 
 
Abstract 
In contrast to theories of regulation which bypass the state and cede 
regulatory authority to private regimes, the scholar Kevin Kolben makes a 
cogent argument for the state to be brought back to centre stage in labour 
regulation, but envisages that private actors can develop and strengthen its 
capacity. This article considers the utility of what he terms an integrative 
approach for Indonesia. In line with what the approach advocates, it 
examines the relationships between private actors and the state and 
considers the extent to which the former can communicate, interact with 
and incentivise the latter in ways which strengthens its regulatory capacity. 
Several challenges are identified. Finally, the potential of the Better Work 




The ways in which worker rights can most effectively be protected in 
developing countries continues to attract scholarly attention, prompting, 
recently, the introduction of various ‘regulation’ frameworks to regulate 
labour in these countries (Sabel, O’Rourke & Fung, 2000; Braithwaite, 
2006; Kolben, 2011). A pressing problem in these countries, often under 
emphasised (e.g. Braithwaite, 2006), is that of overcoming the limited 
capacity of the state to regulate labour. Weak adherence to the rule of law, 
a lack of enforcement capacity, opposition from business in implementing 
labour regulations and high levels of corruption are particularly severe and 
contribute to regulatory failure (Graham & Woods, 2006). Many 
developing countries are also unwilling to regulate, anxious to offer cheap 
unregulated labour as they compete for foreign capital (Mayer & Gereffi, 
2010). This unwillingness is further encouraged by the continual emphasis 
on deregulation by international organisations such as the IMF, WTO and 
the World Bank. In response to the inability and unwillingness of these 
states to regulate labour, scholarly discussion has shifted, in the last twenty 
years, to questioning the potential of ‘soft’ law and non-mandatory 
measures to safeguard workers’ rights; e.g. compliance with Codes of 
Conduct, certification of firms observing international ‘ethical’ auditing 
standards, compliance with international disclosure requirements and 
promoting Corporate Social Responsibility. 
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An ‘Integrative Approach’ to Labour Regulation  
In a recent article (2011),
1
 Kolben notes the emergence of transnational 
private regulatory regimes (TPLR) in developing countries which seek to 
substitute or supplement what the state, by virtue of its institutional and 
structural deficiencies, cannot provide.
2
 Various forms of private regulation 
have replaced what has been the traditional regulatory role of the state. But 
these kinds of private regulation are subject to various criticisms and may 
be insufficient, even destructive, responses to deficiencies in national 
labour law enforcement. Unlike public law and enforcement mechanisms in 
democratic societies, they are unresponsive to political and democratic 
processes and pressures (TPLR is a top-down, managerialist and privatised 
form of governance in which the regulated subjects, i.e., workers, have 
little input into its content or application), are far less stable (because it is 
dependent on consumer preferences and the actions of civil society) and the 
quality of various systems is highly variable and does not necessarily 
prioritise the protection of core labour standards (pp. 408, 409). Kolben 
also notes that the emergence of TPLR has coincided with the rise of 
several governance theories of regulation which move away from relying 
on the state as regulator. They have been applied to labour regulation and 
development and global supply chains. Kolben casts doubts on the 
helpfulness of these theories on the basis that they investigate and discuss 
regulatory phenomena that take place in the context of developed countries 
(and so, are unsuitable for regulation in developing countries), cede 
regulation to private regulatory regimes, leapfrog over dysfunctional states 
and are agnostic about the traditional goals and values of labour law (pp. 
427, 428). He proposes an alternative approach to labour regulation, what 
he terms an integrative approach.
3
 In contrast to the theories he critiques 
                                                          
1
 Kolben, K. (2011) “Transnational Labour Regulation and the Limits of 
Governance”, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 12, 2, Article 2 
2
 Kolben makes several references to dysfunctional states and categorises 
them as those possessing eg. ‘weak state capacity’, ‘lack of respect for the 
rule of law’ poor enforcement of the law’ ‘lack of state legitimacy’ ‘poorly 
functioning states’ ‘underdeveloped regulatory regimes’ (pp. 406, 415, 418, 
427, 429). 
3
 For a discussion of a similar concept (‘integrative linkage’) in the context 
of international trade, see Kolben, K. (2007), “Integrative Linkage: 
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(systems theory, responsive regulation, new governance), this approach 
brings the state back in and places it centre stage in regulating labour. 
Unlike these theories, it emphasises a pivotal role for the state in labour 
regulation and in the development of state-led democratic governance in 
developing countries. It thus seeks to develop state capacity where it is 
lacking where there are compelling pragmatic or social justice reasons for 
doing so (pp.405, 432). 
 
Kolben, in his article, sets down the parameters for an integrative 
approach. He argues that an integrative approach ought to be implemented 
on a case by case and context specific basis, to take into consideration 
differences in law and legal culture. It takes into account the fact that 
workplaces in developing countries often contain marked power 
imbalances. Thus, regulation which relies completely on deliberation and 
benchmarking at the expense of rights and citizenship (‘top down’ 
approaches such as reliance on international organisations or Codes of 
Conduct or law to regulate labour), are unsuitable. The approach further 
focuses on state capacity building and links labour regulation and other 
developmental goals such as democracy building and human rights (p. 
433). Significantly, Kolben presses the point that private and public 
regulatory regimes can operate in complementary fashions. He envisages 
systems of communication and interaction between private and public 
regulatory actors with the explicit goal of developing public regulatory 
regimes where those regimes are weak (2011: pp. 434 – 436). Kolben  
envisages that interaction between state and private actors may be 
deliberate (where engagement between the private and public is done 
willingly and self-consciously as part of an intentional regulatory strategy, 
p. 434) as well as unintentional (where actors do not intend to, or actively 
desire to, engage in communication/coordination, p. 434). Both types are 
capable of developing state regulatory capacity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Combining Public and Private Regulatory Approaches in the Design of 
Trade and Labour Regimes”, Harvard International Law Journal, 48, 1, 
203 – 256 
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Making a Case for the ‘Integrative Approach’  
In making a case for the ‘integrative approach’, Kolben drew from three 
case studies. He referred to Amengual (2010) who examined labour 
practices of a multinational in the apparel sector in the Dominican 
Republic. Amengual noted how private actors (the multinational ‘ABC’) 
were able to increase state involvement (Secretaria de Estado de Trabajo 
or ‘SET’ labour inspectorates) in labour regulation. With different styles of 
regulation and varying types of competencies, state and private actors had 
distinct comparative advantages in identifying poor labour standards. For 
example, there was an increased demand for state inspection services by 
factories required by ‘ABC’ auditors to provide certain documents or state 
certificates. The state tended to focus on freedom of association issues 
whilst auditors concentrated on health and safety. Further, the state relied 
on complaints from workers and requests from management for 
inspections, whilst auditors concentrated on issues in Codes of Practice. In 
all cases, as state and private actors pursued similar goals, their different 
ways of tackling issues, together with their comparative advantages, 
widened the range of problems they could remedy, even where express 
coordination between them was lacking.
4
 Nonetheless, Amengual 
cautioned that ensuring that the comparative advantages of one regulator 
complement those of another in a way which would widen the sphere of 
regulation in the way described may not be always possible in countries 
with extremely weak public and private labour actors (Amengual, 2010: p. 
413). 
 
                                                          
4
 On the comparative advantages of regulators, Amengual noted the works 
of other scholars who studied the approach adopted by labour inspectors 
toward monitoring standards in the Latin American region. See Piore, M. & 
Shrank, A. (2008) “Toward Managed Flexibility: The Revival of Labour 
Inspection in the Latin World” International Labour Review, 147, 1, 1 – 23  
who noted the pedagogic and flexible nature of the Latin model of labour regulation 
which focused on rehabilitation rather than deterrence, and Pires, R. (2008), 
“Promoting Sustainable Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and Compliance 
Outcomes in Brazil” International Labour Review, 147, 2-3, 199 – 229 who 
suggests that sustainable compliance solutions in the Brazilian workplace resulted 
from a combination of coercive and pedagogical enforcement strategies. 
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Kolben also drew from the work of Seidman (2007) who, in discussing the 
success of transnational labour activist networks in monitoring labour 
standards in Guatemala, noted that the work of the Commission for the 
Verification of Codes of Conduct (COVERCO) was regarded not as “an 
alternative to oversight by state institutions but rather as a key part of trying 
to strengthen and democratise them.” (p. 432). COVERCO’s strategic and 
philosophical commitment (aiming, through private regulation, to develop 
state capacity and democratic institutions) allowed it to shift the focus of 
attention away from MNCs toward local concerns (even conducting 
training for the Guatemalan labour inspectorate to improve their capacity). 
Thus it strengthened state capacity to intervene on behalf of vulnerable 
citizens at work. Kolben notes Seidman’s argument that activists should 
focus their efforts on shoring up weak states and reinforcing national 
institutions (p. 432). 
Finally, Kolben referred to research conducted by Barenberg (2007) on the 
Workers’ Rights Consortium (WRC) in Mexico and Indonesia. Barenberg 
(2007) explained that a factor which enabled the WRC to improve 
standards in factories in Mexico and Indonesia was:  
 “The WRC seeks to develop an intensive model of private monitoring, but 
it opposes the displacement of legitimate sovereign authorities and workers' 
organisations by private organisations. It therefore seeks to cooperate with 
and build the capacity of local labour ministries and tribunals, just as it and 
other private monitors attempt to build the capacity of local NGOs...”  
 
Barenberg listed several distinctive factors which contributed to WRC’s 
success in securing the freedom of association in the factories investigated, 
not least its emphasis on continuous detailed remediation by factory 
managers as opposed to on-spot checks by auditors, building high trust 
relationships with workers and their neighbourhoods and forging deep 
relationships with local actors who were able to ensure that remediation 
efforts reached rural villages and informal workers, and who could 
understand and negotiate the complex political environment (Barenberg, 
2007: pp. 61 – 63). 
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Kolben’s attraction to Seidman’s and Barenberg’s case studies lies in their 
conceptualisations of private regulation as state-focused and democratic (p. 
432). On Amengual, Kolben draws attention to the ways private and public 
enforcement regimes engaged with and impact each other on the ground (p. 
430). He asserts: “What is needed, therefore, is an approach to the new 
private developments in global labour governance that, rather than 
leapfrogging over dysfunctional states as some governance theories seek to 
do, aims instead to develop state capacity and calls for state action in 
realms where private regulation lacks legitimacy, or where it is likely to fail 
in the longer term.” (p. 433). 
 
The Integrative Approach and Indonesia 
If we are persuaded by the value and importance of the integrative 
approach to labour regulation for developing countries, a natural step 
would be to make a case for its adoption in countries notorious for poor 
labour standards and dysfunctional states. An example of such a country is 
Indonesia. Indonesia is one of the world’s leading exporters of textiles and 
apparel products and host to many foreign multinationals. With 240 million 
people, it is the fourth most populous country in the world and an important 
economy in employment terms. Yet less than 40% of its 150 million 
working population are in formal employment, with the great majority 
working in the informal sector with inadequate legal protection. Women 
are treated as flexible and expendable workers. The exploitation of child 
labour is a serious problem. Indonesia has been the target of several 
international petitions criticising its failure to meet internationally 
recognised labour standards, although it has ratified all eight ILO core 
labour conventions. Labour law enforcement remains weak and 
inconsistent, because of a lack of resources, high levels of corruption 
between state and business and a desire to attract foreign capital. Its slow 
economic recovery since the Asian financial crisis has pushed more 
workers into the informal sector, reducing their protection and creating 
fertile conditions for child labour. The Indonesian government faces several 
challenges simultaneously: securing economic growth, raising living 
standards and improving labour conditions. Indonesia is also a prime 
P a g e  | 7 
 
example of a country where private labour regulatory regimes have failed 
to protect workers (see discussions in the sections below). It is therefore a 
suitable country to test Kolben’s theory. In tackling this task, this article 
will examine how private and public labour regulatory regimes in 
Indonesia engage with each other in its regulatory environment. It will also 
ask to what extent the former incentivises, encourages and puts pressure on 
the state to improve its regulatory capacity (whether deliberately or 
unintentionally). Finally, it analyses the potential of recent efforts by the 
international community to improve labour standards in Indonesia – the 
Better Work Program (BWP). Promisingly, the Program reflects elements 
of the integrative approach where employers, international buyers 
(MNCs), unions and the state collaborate to improve labour standards. An 
interesting question is the extent to which it is possible for BWP to 
contribute to developing state regulatory capacity in ways envisaged under 
the approach. 
Indonesian Employment Relations  
We take, as a starting point, employment relations in Indonesia post- 
Soeharto (1967 – 1998), as this period signified the start of democracy and 
new opportunities for workers to organise. Under Soeharto, unions were 
systematically suppressed, and they had virtually no influence in the policy 
making processes for economic development (Hadiz, 1997; Tjandra, 2008, 
2010). Although workers inherited a series of protective legislation enacted 
after independence in 1945, they were not implemented in practice. Acting 
in the name of ‘economic development’ and with a strong military at his 
disposal, Soeharto did not see any need to change the law where it could 
simply be ignored. Until the end of his dictatorship, the SPSI (Serikat 
Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, or All Indonesia Workers Union) was the only 
union allowed to operate throughout Indonesia and its leaders were 
generally picked by Soeharto himself. Its role was to assist with controlling 
the workers in line with his labour policies and was known for its pro-
management stance.  
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Post-Soeharto, the Habibie government (1998 – 1999) introduced laws 
which favoured trade unions and workers’ participation, in part, to change 
the authoritarian image of the Soeharto era. Since the reform and relaxation 
of union formation regulations in 1998, unions have grown phenomenally: 
from only one in early 1998 to 100 national federations in late 2009, 
including four national confederations, and thousands of non-nationally 
registered plant level unions. Indonesia was also the first country in Asia 
Pacific to ratify all core conventions of the ILO, including Conventions No. 
87 and 98 on the rights to associate and collective bargaining. Many 
imprisoned labour activists were released and several former trade 
unionists were appointed as government ministers. These appointments are 
symptomatic of a major shift in government policy towards greater support 
of labour rights and standards (Rupidara & McGraw, 2010).  
 
Yet workers have not benefitted in the way they had expected. The 1997 
financial crisis brought down the Soeharto regime, but it also paved the 
way for economic liberalisation. As with many other developing countries, 
Indonesia had spiralled into an economic crisis in 1997-98, and it was 
forced to concede to the neo-liberal prescriptions of the IMF in exchange 
for a $43 billion bailout loan. Alongside laws enacted to protect workers 
after 1998, were those which also promoted labour market flexibility 
(legitimisation of outsourcing practices, non-permanent contracts, mass 
redundancies, reduced severance pay). The use of private employment 
agencies to recruit workers allowed employers to by-pass their legal 
obligations to these workers. They also led to the creation of more non-
permanent jobs (in an economy with an already huge labour surplus). 
Despite unions having greater freedom to organise, many firms refused 
their involvement in the workplace. With numbers of regular workers 
diminishing, unionism declined. Significantly, there are benefits to be 
gained from low level regulation of labour, especially if countries are 
competing for foreign capital. Graham & Woods (2006) note that 
developing countries have limited capacity to regulate labour, but that 
equally, many lack the political will to regulate, hoping to attract investors 
favouring countries with weak regulatory systems (pp.868, 869). In this 
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regard, Indonesia is no exception. Poor enforcement of labour laws, high 
levels of corruption, close relationships between business and government 
and an unwillingness of the state to regulate labour all exacerbated the 
position of workers (Feridhanusetyawan & Pangestu, 2003; Kristiensen & 
Lambang, 2005; Tjandraningsih & Nugroho, 2008, Suryomenggolo, 2009; 
Juliawan, 2010; Rupidara & McGraw, 2010).  
 
It is against this background of weak state structures and institutions, 
pursuit of economic growth at the expense of labour rights and weak 
bargaining power on the part of workers that Indonesian labour relations 
must be understood. It is also within this context that the prospects and 
challenges of moving toward an integrative approach to labour regulation 
need to be discussed. 
 
Private Actors developing State Regulatory Capacity in Indonesia 
Can private actors in Indonesia serve a more dynamic role than they do 
currently and build state regulatory capacity? Kolben was explicit about 
private actors doing this by willingly and self consciously engaging with 
the state to develop its capacity, but that the same results could be achieved 
even where no such deliberate engagement existed, where communication 
and coordination between the private and public was unintentional and 
informal (as in the Amengual case study). The following sections consider 
the ways in which three private actors, namely, unions, NGOs and MNCs 
engage with the state in the regulation of labour and evaluate their potential 
to identify, target and remedy deficiencies in state regulatory capacity. 
 
I) Unions 
Unions can encourage and motivate the state to expand its regulatory 
capacity in the realm of labour in several ways. They can, for example, 
promote a culture in which the regulation of labour is expected in the 
workplace, thus putting pressure on the state to intervene. Because of their 
continuous presence in the workplace, they can complement the monitoring 
activities of labour inspectors by presenting to the latter information about 
labour violations which are not easy to detect (temperatures in factories at 
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certain times of the day might fall below what is required under the law, 
use of child labour during specific seasons, mistreatment of casual and 
irregular workers who do not work on site). They can also join forces with 
their affiliates to, collectively, lobby against the state to reform and enforce 
labour laws to benefit workers.  
 
Some observations on the potential of unions to work in ways which can 
develop or strengthen state regulatory capacity may be made. Unions in 
Indonesia are generally under-developed, lack political influence and suffer 
from low levels of competence. It was noted above that, in theory, unions 
were, after the Soeharto regime, better placed to represent workers and that 
many independent unions were formed in the post-Soeharto era. In reality, 
however, unions have not been able to capitalise on the new opportunities. 
Many were in the earliest stages of organising and had not developed 
strategies for defending workers’ interests. They were thrust into a situation 
where they had to respond to labour law reform programs with little 
experience, few resources and even less political power. Suryomenggolo 
(2009) noted that in the labour law reform process post-Soeharto, unions in 
fact received little information about the process and were not consulted. 
Their lack of political power meant that they could not fully articulate and 
promote their interests at the outset, and worse still, laws were 
consequently passed which imposed greater constraints on their future 
responses and strategies (pp. 2, 10).
5
 Tornquist’s (2004) account of the 
democratisation process in Indonesia also revealed the marginal role of 
labour, emphasising its lack of capacity and influence. Changes in politics 
were influenced by middle class politicians and intellectuals, neither of 
whom drew on the labour movement for support. Ford (2006c) suggests 
that prospects for effective trade unionism post-Soeharto have been limited 
by external constraints on unions and weaknesses in their internal 
structures. Although Indonesia’s employment relations climate appears 
                                                          
5
 See also Uwiyono, A. (2007), “Indonesian Labour Reform Since 1998”, 
in Naoyuki Sakumoto and Hikmahanto Juwana (Eds), Reforming Laws and 
Institutions in Indonesia: An Assessment, (IDE-JETRO, Faculty of Law 
University of Indonesia Press, Jakarta), pp. 187 – 203. 
P a g e  | 11 
 
more conducive to trade unionism, ongoing economic difficulties mean that 
unions have little strategic bargaining power either nationally or on the 
shop floor. Other factors, such as knowledge differentials between union 
leaders and members, the lack of ability on the part of workers to 
communicate effectively and participate in union activities also contributed 
to weak trade unionism. The generally low organisational capacity of 
unions, coupled with high unemployment and a chronic labour surplus have 
eroded their role in labour relations. Finally, although the numbers of 
unions have increased greatly, they have also shown a strong tendency to 
become embroiled in infighting, and are marked more by fragmentation 
and division than effective cooperation. Consequently, it is unsurprising 
that they have not been able to mitigate the effects of large scale 
liberalisation of labour laws which legitimised exploitative labour practices 
(Heryanto & Hadiz, 2005; Rupidara & McGraw, 2010; Juliawan, 2010). In 
sum, it is arguable that their weak and fragmented state, lack of political 
influence and generally low levels of competence pose great challenges for 
unions to strengthen state regulation, or incentivise or put pressure on it to 
improve its regulatory capacity.  
 
 
II) NGOs  
Labour standards monitoring by NGOs are expanding rapidly in developing 
countries (O’Rourke, 2003; Wells, 2007). NGOs help workers in a variety 
of ways, from monitoring firm compliance with Codes, to representing 
workers in disputes against employers, meeting their welfare and 
recreational needs and helping them form unions. To what extent are 
NGOs, as private actors, also able to develop and strengthen state 
regulatory capacity in the realm of labour? For example, can they advocate 
improved democratic governance in the workplace in ways which cause the 
state to respond favourably to the right to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining? Can their competencies complement those of the 
state to train labour inspectors to detect a wider range of labour violations? 
In the realm of politics, can their representatives conduct formal meetings 
with the state to coordinate their mechanisms to regulate labour?  
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Empirical research however, also reveals that NGOs are limited by various 
internal weaknesses (O’Rourke, 2003; Ebenshade, 2004; Wells, 2006; 
Wells, 2007), all of which impact negatively on their ability to develop or 
expand state regulatory capacity. Their potential to do so is further limited 
by disagreements between themselves and other private actors (Frundt, 
2004). Last but not least, many NGOs capitalise on the language of human 
rights to improve working conditions for labour, a strategy which might not 
be entirely appropriate. Human rights and labour rights are different both as 
concepts and as movements. While human rights seek to limit the power of 
the state, labour rights aim to limit the power of private actors in the 
market. While human rights revolve around individuals and seek to achieve 
outcomes such as better working conditions, labour rights are more 
collectively orientated, with worker mobilisation and negotiations 
processes taking precedence. The language of human rights does not 
necessarily examine and question fundamental economic relationships in 
society, nor is it committed to direct action as a method, or workplace 
democracy as a goal, to the same extent as the labour movement (Kolben, 
2010). 
O’Rourke (2003) notes that the ability of firms to move production quickly 
among factories and hide behind multiple layers of ownership makes 
systematic inspections of compliance with Codes by NGOs a difficult task 
(p. 23). NGOs are also liable to miss many of the largest issues faced by 
workers because they do not have continuous workplace presence. 
Moreover, as NGOs typically focus on workers in first-tier suppliers and 
large factories, they rarely reach down to informal-sector workers. Even 
worse, monitoring by NGOs crowds out the efforts of workers’ 
organisations (p. 22)
6
 and in many instances, where results are damning, 
firms have ended contracts with poor performing factories, leading to job 
                                                          
6
 O’Rourke draws from literature which shows how NGOs supplant 
unions’ roles as worker advocates by discussing wages and working 
conditions with factories – a process which helps powerful companies 
avoid union organising, collective agreements and government regulation. 




 In analysing NGO monitoring of firm compliance with Codes in 
supplier factors in the ‘global south’, Wells (2007) noted that NGOs, inter 
alia, lacked autonomy, provided incomplete and inaccurate reports, did not 
focus on core labour standards, were unable to provide remedies which 
remained at the discretion of firms and were helpless when firms relocated 
to avoid monitoring. He opined that an NGO-centred, ‘soft law’ policy 
approach to labour regulation was simply ‘too weak for the job’ (pp. 51, 
65). Similarly, in the flower export industries in Columbia and Ecuador, 
Korovkin & Sanmiguel Valderrama (2007) noted that although firms and 
NGOs had the same goals, conflict arose because both wanted monitoring 
processes to be carried out in line with their own preferences. Firms 
avoided the issue of worker organisation and concentrated on less 
controversial aspects of labour standards. NGOs, on the other hand, 
regarded the existence of independent trade unions as a prerequisite for 
ensuring compliance with labour norms. At times, relationships between 
labour NGOs and unions have become so riddled with complications that 
NGOs have been dissolved (Frundt, 2004).  
 
NGOs have enjoyed a long presence in labour regulation in Indonesia, 
primarily because of the repression of trade union activities, but also 
because of the significant portion of unorganised and unorganisable 
workers (Hadiz, 2001; Nyman, 2006: 103 – 104). Soeharto initially 
welcomed the interventions of NGOs in society, because they were 
committed to community development projects and could reach the poorest 
segments of society. In the 1980s however, their activities were severely 
curtailed in the name of ‘de-ideologisation’ and ‘depoliticisation’. Soeharto 
promoted the Pancasila ideology (Soeharto’s version emphasised 
harmonious and cooperative relationships between labour and employer) 
and no organisation was allowed to pursue alternative ones. As a result, 
many NGOs lacked their own ideologies which would have been useful in 
                                                          
7
 See also O’Rourke, D. (2002), “Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of 
Corporate Third Party Labour Monitoring” in R. Jenkins, R. Pearson, & G. 
Seyfang (Eds.), Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights: Codes of 
Conduct in the Global Economy, (London: Earthscan), pp. 196 – 208 
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directing their movements. They also had to adjust to the Soeharto era by 
keeping a low profile for fear of being banned or dissolved. 
 
The post-Soeharto era brought new opportunities to NGO to participate in 
politics and society (Hadiz, 2001; Ford, 2003, 2006a, 2006b; Nyman, 2006; 
Rupidara & McGraw, 2010). In the workplace, Ford noted that labour 
NGOs fulfilled a range of functions which lay both outside and within the 
traditional ambit of unions. These included activities associated with 
grassroots labour organising (education, establishing community workers’ 
groups, providing legal services, encouraging strike actions) as well as 
research and policy advocacy (documenting the living and working 
conditions of factory labour, lobbying government and firms to increase the 
minimum wage, improving health and safety, campaigning for changes to 
labour legislation). Further, many NGOs built networks with each other, 
with unions and with international organisations to advance worker rights. 
She contended that so crucial are NGOs to the improvement of labour 
standards that they should be regarded as a movement in their own right 




Nonetheless, the fact remains that Indonesia is a relatively young 
democracy, with weak administrative and governance structures. Whilst the 
number of NGOs has grown significantly post-Soeharto, many still struggle 
to engage with government, the business community and other 
stakeholders, diminishing their influence on the state in the regulation of 
labour. Hadiz (2001) noted that relations between NGOs and unions tend to 
be one of proliferation rather than consolidation. Unions also sought to 
                                                          
8
 However, Ford (2009) also shows there were several problems which 
limited the effectiveness of NGOs to improve labour standards, not least 
their uneasy relationship with unions. Many NGOs regarded themselves as 
outsiders who were only a partial and temporary substitute for ‘true’ unions 
organised by workers. As unions grew in significant numbers post-
Soeharto, many labour NGOs responded by pulling back from their once 
dominant position in the labour movement. An “extremely complicated” 
relationship between unions and NGOs emerged “as a result of different 
expectations of the terms of NGO involvement and the extent of their 
commitment to the labour movement” (p. 133).  
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limit the role of NGOs in their activities, in order to encourage rank and file 
leadership to emerge (p. 122). Such tendencies restrict NGOs and unions 
from successfully collaborating together to lobby the state to improve 
labour standards. In addition, the leader-follower structure of many NGOs, 
and the unwillingness of many leaders to address issues of succession, has 
not prepared NGOs for capacity development. In a recent study of attempts 
of NGOs to improve labour standards for women workers, for example, 
Yazid (2008) noted that their collaborations and networks with each other 
and with the state were hampered by rivalries, different perceptions on how 
to interact with the government, unwillingness to share information and 
intense competition for funding. Weak coordination and different 
approaches to the same problems caused networks to become stagnant and 
weak. As a result, many of their activities did not progress beyond mere 
information sharing, conducting joint research and issuing press statements. 
Finally, the lack of an umbrella organisation for NGOs means that there is 
no central body which functions as a representative in promoting the 
existence and the interests of NGOs to outside parties and to help with 
internal capacity building purposes (Antlov, Ibrahim & Tuijl, 2007; Antlov, 
Binkerhoff & Rapp, 2008).  
 
Indeed, a serious problem confronting NGOs in Indonesia, limiting their 
potential to influence the state is their lack of capacity building (Fanany, 
Fanany & Kenny, 2009).
9
 Many are temporary, set up quickly in response 
to funding availability for a specific project, but collapsing after funding 
becomes unavailable. This leads to a high degree of impermanence and 
transfer of staff between established and newly formed NGOs. Political 
                                                          
9
 The authors argue that the concept is poorly understood in Indonesia. It 
has been adopted into the Indonesian development vocabulary without 
debate or discussion of its relevance for the local context. ‘Capacity 
building’ is often thought to mean the general capacity of individuals 
within organisations, as opposed to the ability of organisations themselves. 
As a result, institutional processes, organisational frameworks and 
accountability mechanisms have been overlooked in favour of training 
programs for staff. Similarly, organisations have rarely undertaken capacity 
building which focuses on the abilities of communities to address collective 
concerns. 
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uncertainty and lack of funding have prevented many NGOs from 
developing sustainable structures and practices (Hadiwinata, 2003). Work 
within an NGO is also often regarded as a stepping stone to something else 
or as a way of becoming employed in society (Fanany, Fanany & Kenny, 
2009: p. 97). Consequently, few employees stay on for long periods in 
NGOs. Finally, the vast majority of Indonesian NGOs consists of middle 
class individuals who are university educated and know little about the 
community or grassroots mobilisation. NGOs thus tend to be micro-
oriented and elitist and are not necessarily sensitive to issues at the local 
level (Hadiwinata, 2003; Fanany, Fanany & Kenny, 2009). 
 
 
III) MNCs  
Finally, to what extent can MNCs, as private actors, develop and strengthen 
state capacity to regulate labour? MNCs such as Reebok, Gap, Nike, adidas 
and Levi Strauss have resided in Indonesia for many years. Many MNCs 
rely on internal compliance with Codes of Conduct as a way of improving 
labour standards in their desire to brand their CSR programs (Bartley, 
2010). Can MNCs, through compliance with these Codes strengthen and 
develop state regulatory capacity? Such Codes may, for example, place an 
obligation on MNCs to enhance the competence of labour inspectors, 
tribunals and labour ministries to expand state regulation. Codes may also 
encourage union presence in the workplace so that consequently, pressure 
is put on the state by unions and their affiliates to improve labour 
standards. Codes may further inspire a culture of acceptance of regulation 
in the workplace. Finally, they may be drafted in a way which allows a 
certain amount of ‘competition’ between MNCs and the state, for example, 
if Codes provided fair and transparent procedures to resolve worker 
grievances, guaranteed that workers could participate in decision making 
on certain issues or implemented advanced labour standards and introduced 
superior working conditions. This would incentivise the state to review its 
own policies and procedures on the same issues. 
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As a type of private regulatory mechanism, however, Codes of Conduct are 
also subject to various criticisms. For example, Seidman (2003), in 
discussing the effectiveness of the Sullivan Principles in improving the 
behaviour of MNCs in South Africa, noted that the monitoring process was 
problematic because, inter alia, firms insisted that the definition of ‘good 
corporate citizenship’ be guided by their own emphases rather than by 
substantive concerns. It was not until enormous pressure was generated by 
activists that firms were persuaded to accept even moderate restrictions on 
their behaviour. She questioned the viability of the voluntaristic, stateless 
character of TNC Codes of Conduct in regulating labour standards (p.403). 
Vogel (2010) shows that while private regulation (specifically, Codes 
which address labour practices, environmental performance and human 
rights policies) has resulted in improvements in corporate behaviour, it 
cannot be regarded as a substitute for the more effective exercise of state 
authority. He contends that ultimately, private regulation must be integrated 
with and reinforced by more effective state-based and enforced regulatory 
policies at both the national and international levels.
10
 Similarly, Locke, 
Kochan, Romis, & Qin (2007) and Locke & Romis (2010) contend that 
whilst Codes can lead to an improvement in general standards, in 
themselves, they may not be sufficient. They are but only part of a larger 
mosaic in efforts to improve working conditions. To be effective, Codes 
and their monitoring systems also need to be e.g. integrated into 
management structures, operations, strategy and HRM, operate within an 
environment in which laws are effectively enforced and be supported by 
HR systems and unions or other institutions which provide workers with a 
voice in production and employment. In other research, it was explicitly 
noted that many MNCs may be eager to monitor labour standards. 
However, labour violations continued to occur because of structural 
deficiencies in the monitoring system: flawed factory audit processes, 
                                                          
10
 In another article, the author argues that Codes face the challenge of 
acquiring legitimacy and of persuading both firms and NGOs of the value 
of their standards. Such regulation addresses but does not resolve the 
challenge of making global firms and markets more effectively and 
democratically governed, Vogel, D. (2009), “Private Global Business 
Regulation” Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 261 – 282  
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inadequate training of auditors and lack of transparency, all which 
conspired to produce incomplete information about existing working 
conditions in supplier factories. A compliance-focused approach to the 
improvement of labour standards is insufficient. In contrast, a commitment-
oriented approach can lead to sustained improvement in working 
conditions and labour rights: repeated interactions, joint problem solving 
and trust building among the key actors (Locke, Amengual & Mangla, 
2009). In her research on the implementation of CSR and Codes of 
Conduct in Indonesia, Kemp (2001) noted the non-involvement of the state 
in the drafting of Codes. Codes are designed in the head office and rarely in 
consultation with other labour relations actors. Codes also place MNCs 
outside of the national regulatory system. The process and outcomes of 
monitoring are confidential. Perhaps surprisingly, she also pointed out not 
only that unions and workers were unaware of Codes or their contents, but 
that many government officials responsible for labour standards had not 
heard of Codes and even mistook them for collective agreements (p. 12). 
 
More generally, CSR is a new concept for the majority of businesses in 
Indonesia. For several decades, the country was cut off from international 
influence and virtually no foreign investment was allowed (Kemp, 2001). 
Isolated from the influence of international standards, its business culture 
has been marred by corruption, rent seeking and a lack of CSR activism, all 
of which have persisted to this day. The country also struggles with high 
levels of poverty and unemployment. Where vast segments of the 
population struggle with day to day survival more than anything else, CSR 
is simply an intangible concept (Kemp, 2001; Koestoer, 2007; Waagstein, 
2011). The influence of cultural norms, in particular the acceptance of 
one’s fate, means that poor working conditions are grudgingly accepted by 
the majority of workers. Many are simply grateful to have any form of 
income and would happily work harder if it meant more earnings (Kemp, 
2001). While many foreign MNCs have introduced labour related CSR 
policies, many other businesses have failed to do so, due to a lack of 
understanding of the concept, unstable political environment, corruption 
and weak law enforcement (Koestoer, 2007).  
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Recent studies carried out in Asian countries (including Indonesia) on the 
potential of CSR to improve labour standards shows its downside in two 
ways (AMRC, 2012). First, it is generally understood as corporate activities 
to compensate for social and economic injustices. This perspective has led 
to the belief that it is the obligation of the business community (MNCs) to 
meet social, economic and environmental requirements, providing a 
justification for the government to escape its obligations towards society. In 
other words, it undermines rather than strengthens state regulatory 
capacity. Secondly, CSR has been used to manipulate workers to avoid 
unions in order to safeguard their rights. Research carried out in 4 MNCs in 
Indonesia revealed that CSR was primarily utilised to build their image. A 
good public image helps firms gain the trust of society, which in turn 
legitimises their operations, increases sales, attracts investors and secures 
greater profits. But there was also a darker side. MNCs discouraged the 
formation of unions by persuading workers to form a workers’ forum 
instead, through enticing them with many CSR programs. CSR was thus 
covertly used to weaken unions’ influence and to persuade them to be 
cooperative with management. Where this was not forthcoming, 
discriminatory action was taken against union leaders and workers 
(exclusion from training and development opportunities, scholarships and 
promotion, non payment of wages and allowances). In sum, CSR was a 
divisive strategy and instead of advancing the interests of workers, was 
used to promote those of the MNCs themselves.  
 
In an effort to persuade the business community to be more responsive to 
the needs of society, the Indonesian government enacted the Indonesian 
Corporation Law No.40/ 2007, and Law No.25/2007 which requires firms 
in the field of natural resources and capital investment projects to engage 
with CSR (Tamam, 2006). Non–compliant firms incur sanctions. These 
laws were regarded as controversial and have become the subject of heated 
debates, since they contradict the general concept of CSR, which stresses 
the element of voluntarism. The business community challenged the laws 
on the basis that they created uncertainty, were unjust and discriminatory 
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and undermined the voluntary basis of CSR although their action was 
unsuccessful (Waagstein, 2011: p. 455). However, government regulations 
which were supposed to be extensions of the Law No.40/2007, were never 
enacted, causing further confusion in the implementation and monitoring of 
CSR (AMRC, 2012). 
 
As a private regulatory mechanism to improve labour standards, CSR is 
both unstable and unreliable. It has been argued that CSR serves the 
interests of the capitalist classes, and political parties hungry for control 
over the economic resources generated by the activities of major firms 
(Rosser & Edwin, 2010).
 
 Instead of incentivising the state to improve its 
regulatory capacity in ways envisaged under the integrative approach, it 
has been used in a self serving manner by MNCs and has sought to reduce, 
rather than increase, state regulation of labour. 
 
Better Work Indonesia: An Integrative Approach? 
The discussion of the extent to which key private actors may develop and 
strengthen state regulatory capacity in the realm of labour in Indonesia has, 
so far, revealed several factors which discourage this from occurring. A 
recent important and favourable development in the regulation of labour in 
Indonesia, however, may bring the goals of the integrative approach to 
fruition.  
FOOTNOTE: In his works (2004, 2007, 2010), Kolben discussed the 
success of Better Factories Cambodia Program in improving labour 
standards in the country’s garment industry. The BFC Program 
utilises mechanisms typically employed by private regulatory regimes, 
as opposed to public regulatory systems. It is an example of how 
private governance systems can help improve public regulation of 
labour standards. It thus gives effect to the philosophy of the 
integrative approach. He also noted that Better Work developed from 
the BFC Program. Can BW also achieve the goals of the approach? 
Kevin Kolben, (2004) “Trade, Monitoring, and the ILO: Working to 
Improve Conditions in Cambodia’s Garment Factories”, 7 Yale 
Human Rights & Development Law Journal, 79, 85–88  
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Kolben, K. (2007) “Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private 
Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and Labour Regimes” 
Harvard International Law Journal, 48, 1, 203 – 256  
 
Kolben, K. (2010) “The WTO Distraction” Stanford Law and Policy 
Review, 21, 3, 461 – 491  
 
The Better Work Program (BWP) is a partnership program between the 
International Labour Organisation and International Finance Corporation to 
improve compliance with labour standards and promote competitiveness in 
global supply chains (specifically, in the apparel and garment industries). 
 
  
Launched in 2007, it is Better Work is today operational in seven countries 
(Cambodia, Haiti, Jordan, Lesotho, Indonesia, Vietnam and Nicaragua) and 
has attracted much publicity regarding the role it has played in improving 
conditions for workers.
11
 Better Work Indonesia (BWI), part of BWP, began 
operations recently in 2011 with the initial geographical focus on the 
Greater Jakarta Area.
12
 Teams have been trained and pilot assessments 
carried out in a number of factories.
13
 BWP adopts an integrated approach 
to improve labour standards through strengthening cooperation between 
governments, employers’ and workers’ organisations and international 
                                                          
11
 See the Better Work website, at < http://www.ilo.org/washington/areas/better-
work/lang--en/index.htm> 
12
 Better Work Indonesia can be found at <http://betterwork.org/indonesia> 
13
 The challenges for BWI are considerable. Evidence collected (42 
factories between September 2011 and February 2012, 918 workers) as the 
BWI was starting up in Indonesia revealed several concerns in relation to 
occupational health and safety, overtime, wages, job security, abuse and 
sexual harassment. See Huq, A. (2012), “Indonesia Baseline Report: 
Worker Perspectives from the Factory and Beyond” International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and International Finance Corporation (IFC) at < 
http://betterwork.com/global/wp-content/uploads/Impact-Research-
Indonesia-Baseline-Report-Worker-Perspectives-from-the-Factory-and-
Beyond.pdf>. BWI’s own assessments of working conditions in apparel 
factories in Indonesia (20 factories, 40, 562 workers in the apparel industry 
in the Greater Jakarta Area) between July 2011 and March 2012 reflect the 
same concerns. See BWI, “Garment Industry 1st Compliance Synthesis 
Report”, 2012, at < http://betterwork.com/global/wp-
content/uploads/Better-Work-Indonesia-Synthesis-Report-EN.pdf> 




 Its approach is three pronged and is tailored to the needs of the 
local context (its programs are therefore country specific: such regulation is 
promoted under the integrative approach).
15
 First, it helps factories identify 
areas of non-compliance with international and national labour standards. 
Secondly, it provides specifically tailored advice to address specific needs 
of each factory through the establishment of Performance Improvement 
Consultative Committees (PICC) which consists of both management and 
union/worker representatives. BWP guides the PICC in the development 
and implementation of an improvement plan, which addresses both non-
compliance issues and management systems. Finally, it offers customised 
training to support workplace cooperation. The training topics range from 
ILO core labour standards and workers’ rights to HRM, supervisory skills 
and occupational safety and health and a highly participatory approach is 
encouraged.
16
 Participating factories agree to be subject to a monitoring 
regime in which the BWP, using its own Code, inspects their labour 
standards. It will then create a general database which consolidates 
compliance and remediation data from each factory, and facilitates sharing 
that information with international buyers. This in turn allows buyers to 
reduce their own auditing and redirect resources to fixing problems and on 
devising sustainable solutions. The benefits BWP offers to governments are 
manifold, and include increased market access, a stronger reputation for 
safer investment and improved capacity in labour administration.
17
 What is 
noteworthy, for our purposes, is that BWP reflects elements of the 
                                                          
14
 International buyers such as Gap and adidas have publicised their 
involvement in the BWP, see for example Gap Inc. ILO/IFC Better Work 
Program at 
<http://www.gapinc.com/content/csr/html/Goals/supplychain/our_program
_in_action/ilo_ifc_better_workprogram.html > and adidas Group Better 
Work at < http://www.adidas-group.com/en/ser2010/suppliers/training-our-
suppliers/better-work/Default.aspx>  
15
 “...an integrative regulatory approach is case by case and context specific 
in its effort to describe regulatory dynamics and prescribe regulatory 
solutions.” (Kolben, 2011, p. 433) 
16
 More information about BWP services (assessment, advisory and 
training) can be accessed at <http://betterwork.org/global/?page_id=331> 
17
 See BWI  at 
<http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/whatwedo/projects/WCMS_180290/lang--
en/index.htm> 
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integrative approach. Private actors (international buyers, employers, trade 
unions) and the state collaborate with each other with a view to improving 
labour standards. Implicit within BW the Program however, is also an effort 
to strengthen state capacity in the regulation of labour.  
 
BWI and the integrative approach 
Might BWI meet the goals of the integrative approach? In addition to 
improving working conditions and industry competitiveness, is there also 
scope for developing and strengthening state regulatory capacity in ways 
envisaged under the approach? IN THE INDONESIAN CONTEXT, 
AND SPECIFICALLY, IN THE LIGHT OF DIFFICULTIES IN 
ACHIEVING PRIVATE-STATE ENGAGEMENT IN THE 
REGULATION OF LABOUR , CAN BWI progressively facilitate 
a regulatory regime in Indonesia where the state occupies centre stage in 
the regulation of labour? How can interventions which incentivise 
cooperation and engagement between the public and private in ways which 
strengthen the capacity of the former be created? WHAT CHALLENGES 
LIE AHEAD? One overarching question and several more specific ones 
may be posed which can guide BWI strategies to meet the goals of the 
integrative approach. How can BWI bring together separate and 
uncoordinated systems which do not function in ways which boost state 
capacity into one where constituent parts optimally engage with each other 
and with the state? More specifically, how can private actors such as 
international buyers and employers’ associations be incentivised to target 
and improve deficiencies in state regulatory capacity?  How can norms and 
practices flow between Codes and other ‘soft’ laws, on the one hand, and 
national laws, on the other, so that they reinforce each other? Can the state, 
unions, employers and international buyers be incentivised to collaborate 
together in designing and enforcing laws with the explicit aim of re-
emphasising the state? How can international buyers create a culture of 
acceptance of regulation among their factories? Do they support 
improvements in their factories? Does regulation by private actors such as 
NGOs or MNCs give reason for the state, particularly where it is weak, to 
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avoid its responsibility? Can the comparative advantages of, for example, 
unions and state labour inspectors be identified and can they complement 
each other in ways which widen the range of labour violations they could 
tackle? Can competition be generated between the state and private actors 
(international buyers or unions) so that the state, for fear of losing its 
legitimacy, compels its own regulators to improve their enforcement? 
Finally, how can regulation promote important development goals such as 




The integrative approach seeks to recapture the importance of the state in 
labour regulation in developing countries. Instead of leapfrogging over 
dysfunctional states, it re-emphasises the state in labour regulation and asks 
how private regulatory regimes might serve to strengthen public regulatory 
capacity. If we are persuaded by its promise and value, is there scope for its 
adoption in Indonesia? A discussion of the labour regulatory regime in 
Indonesia shows that this is an ambitious task. An analysis of the 
relationships between the state and three private actors (unions, NGOs, 
firms) in Indonesia reveal the challenges in incentivising interactions and 
communications between them in ways which can strengthen state labour 
regulatory capacity. There is little evidence that the private and public 
complement each other’s actions or build interdependent relationships. The 
relationships between private actors themselves are also complicated, 
which reduces the prospects of joint efforts to expand state regulatory 
capacity. This article has however, also discussed the potential of the recent 
BWI Program in fulfilling the goals of the integrative approach. An outline 
of broad strategies which can expand state regulatory capacity within the 
parameters of the BWI program is offered. Given that appropriate structures 
are already in place to stimulate collaborations between the public and 
private within the local context, BWI perhaps presents an ideal opportunity 
to sow the seeds of the approach and for carving out the space in which it 
might be put into practice. If successful, it would provide a model for 
further and more ambitious initiatives. 
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